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AVOIDING THE INEQUITIES CREATED BY IN RE DELCO
OIL, INC.—THE NEED FOR AN INNOCENT VENDOR
EXCEPTION
ABSTRACT
In In re Delco Oil, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether a chapter 7
trustee can avoid a debtor’s unauthorized transfer of cash collateral to a
vendor that transacts in good faith and for equivalent value. The Eleventh
Circuit strictly interpreted 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550 by holding that the
trustee has the power to avoid such a transfer. This decision is problematic for
two reasons. First, the innocent vendor had to forfeit the goods that it
transferred and any cash collateral received in exchange. Second, the decision
created an absurd result by preventing the innocent vendor from obtaining an
administrative expense claim even though it conferred a benefit on the estate.
This decision effectively prevents an innocent vendor from receiving any
compensation for the sale of its goods.
This Comment argues that an innocent vendor exception would prevent the
negative consequences resulting from Delco and further the goals of
bankruptcy. It supports this position in several ways. First, it examines the
absurd results caused by Delco and the relevant legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Code. Second, it surveys the sizable burden that Delco places on
vendors before engaging in transactions. Third, it analyzes other ways in
which the court can police the debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral.
Fourth, it examines the extent of § 105 and other case law to delineate the
authority to create such an exception.
An innocent vendor exception would ensure an equitable result in cases
analogous to Delco because it would prevent an innocent vendor, as an
innocent transferee, from receiving a double penalty due to the debtor’s
misconduct. Furthermore, such an outcome would be consistent with the goal
of § 550, which is to put the estate in the same position it would have been had
the transaction not occurred.

MENDOZA GALLEYSPROOFS2

258

3/5/2014 9:10 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

INTRODUCTION
The reasoning underlying chapter 11 is that it is generally preferable to
continue to operate and reorganize a troubled business rather than to liquidate
it.1 In light of this goal, it is important for the business to preserve its assets for
equitable distribution to its creditors.2 The preservation of assets, however,
may create problems for innocent third parties. Consider a scenario where a
vendor enters into an agreement with a company through which the vendor
will provide goods in exchange for cash. Unbeknownst to the vendor, the
company it is selling goods to is in chapter 11 bankruptcy and pays the vendor
with its cash collateral.3 To make matters worse, there may be restrictions on
the company’s use of cash collateral. If the company’s chapter 11
reorganization is converted to chapter 7 liquidation, the appointed trustee may
seek to avoid the payment made to the vendor with the cash collateral. It seems
clear that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) authorizes such an avoidance under
§ 549, which allows the trustee to avoid an unauthorized transaction made
postpetition.4 But an avoidance in this case is far from equitable, as the estate
receives a windfall and the vendor is unable to receive compensation for the
transfer.
Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), is the most
recent case dealing with the issue of whether an unauthorized transfer of cash
collateral by a debtor in possession, who paid for goods used in its ordinary
course of business, can be avoided under § 549(a) of the Code.5 In this case,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that a chapter 7 trustee could avoid a debtor’s
transfer of cash collateral made to an “innocent vendor.”6 The court came to
this ruling even though the vendor acted in good faith and arguably exchanged
the goods for equivalent value.7 As a result of this ruling, the vendor was
forced to forfeit both the cash consideration it received and the inventory it
transferred to the company.8

1

7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2009).
See id.
3 See infra Part I.C.
4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550 (2012).
5 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010).
6 An “innocent vendor” is a vendor that “received cash collateral for value, in good faith and without
knowledge of the voidability of the transfers.” Id. (citing Hankin v. Mersey Mold & Model Co. (In re
Countryside Manor, Inc.), 239 B.R. 443, 447 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1999)).
7 See id.
8 Id.
2
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Delco has received its fair share of criticism, mainly due to the punishment
it imposed on a vendor who dealt in good faith and merely exchanged valued
goods in return for payment from a debtor.9 These innocent vendors are
oftentimes not aware that the company they do business with is in bankruptcy,
nor are they aware that the company may be using cash collateral to pay for
goods without proper authorization.10 Notwithstanding the inequity resulting
from Delco, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that there was no other way to police
§ 363(c)(2) of the Code, which prohibits a debtor’s use of cash collateral
without court authorization.11
The court added that §§ 549 and 550 did not explicitly include an “innocent
vendor” exception.12 The court’s plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and
550 is another important critique of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, because
this approach arguably led to an absurd result.13 By strictly interpreting §§ 549
and 550, the court prevented an innocent vendor from obtaining an
administrative expense claim from the estate, and effectively rendered the
innocent vendor’s claim unsecured.14 Additionally, the court failed to address
whether the secured creditor or the estate was entitled to receive the avoided
funds.15
There are ways to avoid these absurd results. Other courts have addressed
this issue without resorting to the plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and
550, and have instead considered other factors to determine whether
unauthorized payment of cash collateral should be avoided.16 These courts
looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute, and considered whether injury
to the estate occurred, and whether the result was inequitable and contrary to
the purpose of the Code.17
9 See id. (doubly punishing the vendor by causing a loss of not only received cash collateral, but also the
inventory it had initially transacted to the debtor).
10 Id. (citation omitted).
11 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2012); Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263.
12 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263.
13 See Rashad L. Blossom & Jennifer H. Henderson, In Re Delco Oil, Inc.—A Cautionary Tale for
Vendors Doing Business with Chapter 11 Debtors, 72 ALA. LAW. 223, 225, 227 (2011).
14 The innocent vendor should have an administrative expense claim in accordance with § 503 of the
Code, but § 502(h) prevents this from happening by allowing avoidance of the transfer via § 549(a); thus, since
the trustee recovers under § 550, the innocent vendor’s claim is transformed into a prepetition unsecured claim
under § 502(h). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 503; infra Part II.B.2.b.
15 See Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257.
16 Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2012); Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 230–31 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011), aff’d,
477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).
17 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 129; C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 242.
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Additionally, the result of Delco runs contrary to the goals and underlying
policy of chapter 11. It places a sizable burden on vendors to investigate
whether the company it conducts business with is in chapter 11, and if it is,
whether it has proper authorization to use cash collateral.18 Performing this due
diligence can be costly and may discourage vendors from conducting further
business with companies in reorganization.19
This Comment will advocate for a judicial exception for innocent vendors
in narrow circumstances similar to Delco—where a vendor transacts in good
faith and for equivalent value with debtors that paid with cash collateral
without proper authorization. This will prevent the negative consequences that
result from Delco. Part I of this Comment will discuss some relevant
provisions of the Code. Part II of this Comment will first discuss Delco to
understand the court’s analysis. Second, it will introduce the criticism that
followed Delco and assess its validity. More importantly, this section will
delve into the absurd results of Delco. Part III of this Comment will consider
the burden that Delco imposes on vendors, and how this burden will likely
affect the way vendors will deal with chapter 11 debtors in the future. Part IV
will show that, contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Delco, there are
other ways of policing § 363(c)(2). Part V of this Comment will show
alternative ways courts can avoid the negative consequences caused by Delco.
First, it will analyze cases similar to Delco, where a party looks to avoid a
postpetition transfer, to demonstrate that there are other ways to deal with
unauthorized postpetition transfers of cash collateral by a debtor. Second, it
will look to the authority that courts can use to exempt innocent vendors from
§§ 549 and 550. More specifically, it will show how courts can draw authority
from § 105 of the Code to prevent the problems from the Delco decision.
Finally, Part VI will analyze how the proposed exception will further the goals
of Code and prevent the absurd results created by Delco.
I. BACKGROUND
A better understanding of §§ 549 and 550 and cash collateral, as well as
their respective purposes, is essential to understanding the consequences that
result from punishing innocent vendors under § 549(a). The avoidance and

18 Jonathan Friedland & Bill Schwartz, Punishing the Innocent: Lessons from Delco Oil, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., May 2010, at 1, 89.
19 See id.
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recovery provisions provided by the Code under §§ 549 and 550 were created
to prevent harm to the estate caused by postpetition transfers.20
A. Section 549(a)
Section 549 is an avoidance provision that allows the trustee or debtor in
possession to avoid unauthorized postpetition transfers of property of the estate
with the goal to “pursue as equal a distribution of assets to creditors as
possible.”21 “To avoid means to make void [or] annul.”22 The purpose of this
section is to prevent postpetition transfers of the debtor’s property from
diminishing the estate.23 Section 549(a) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the
trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate —
(1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and
(2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of
this title or by the court; or
24
(B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.

This provision has been widely applied, even when there is fraud by the debtor
or good faith on part of the transferee.25
B. Section 550(a)
Section 550(a) works in conjunction with § 549(a) to promote one of the
main goals of bankruptcy law—to preserve the estate’s assets for an equitable
distribution to creditors.26 Once a transfer has been avoided under § 549(a),
§ 550(a) provides:
(a) except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549,
553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the
benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so
orders, the value of such property, from —

20

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550 (2012).
Id. § 549; Gonzales v. Nabisco Div. of Kraft Foods, Inc. (In re Furrs), 294 B.R. 763, 775 (Bankr.
D.N.M. 2003) (citing Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)).
22 C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 231 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.02 (citations omitted).
24 11 U.S.C. § 549.
25 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.02 (citations omitted).
26 See Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2012).
21
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(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose
benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
27
transferee.

Therefore, the purpose of § 550(a) is to “restore the estate to the financial
condition it would have enjoyed if the transfer had not occurred.”28
Accordingly, its focus “is not on what the transferee gained by the transaction
but rather on what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the transfer.”29 To
achieve this purpose, the “overwhelming majority of courts interpret the phrase
‘benefit of the estate’ liberally, holding that the property or its value may be
recovered even if creditors have been paid in full under a plan.”30
C. The Importance of Cash Collateral
A company undergoing chapter 11 reorganization is oftentimes deprived of
cash.31 The use of any available funds could be the difference between the
company failing or surviving the reorganization period.32 In an effort to obtain
cash, the debtor may even be forced to sell some of its encumbered assets.33
The Code defines the proceeds of the encumbered assets as cash collateral.34
More specifically, cash collateral is defined as “cash and cash equivalents” in
which both “the estate and [another entity] have an interest.”35
Even though cash collateral could provide much needed cash for
reorganization efforts, the Code imposes certain restrictions on a debtor’s use
of cash collateral.36 Although the Code allows the debtor in possession—as
trustee of the estate—to use the available funds of the estate so long as it is in

27

11 U.S.C. § 550.
Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).
29 Id.
30 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 549.01 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
31 See Donald T. Polednak, Is the Secured Creditor Really “Secure”?: A Survey of Remedies and
Sanctions for a Debtor’s Unauthorized Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 31 WASHBURN L.J.
344, 346 (1992).
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2012).
35 Id. (“‘[C]ash collateral’ means cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit
accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate
have an interest and includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property and the fees,
charges, accounts . . . whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title.”).
36 See id. § 363(c)(2).
28
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the ordinary course of business, those rights are restricted when the debtor in
possession is using cash collateral.37 Section 363(c)(2) prohibits the use of cash
collateral, even during the ordinary course of business, unless the debtor in
possession obtains consent from either the secured creditor, or authorization
from the bankruptcy court after notice and hearing.38
This restriction attempts to balance the conflicting interests of the debtor in
possession and the secured creditor.39 While secured creditors run the risk that
their collateral will be consumed, the chapter 11 debtor is short on cash and
probably needs to use the cash collateral to rehabilitate its business.40 By
allowing the debtor in possession to use cash collateral only after the secured
creditor’s objections (if any) have been heard, § 363(c)(2) protects the secured
creditor’s priority status and the property interest in the collateral should the
cash collateral be spent.41 Unfortunately for the debtor in possession, this
restriction may prove too great a hurdle if it does not have the resources to
reorganize without the use of the cash collateral.42
Unsurprisingly, a debtor in possession may still choose to use cash
collateral without authorization, and in such an event, the Code fails to provide
a specific penalty for debtors or a remedy for injured secured creditors.43

37
38

Id.
Section 363(c)(2) states:
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this subsection
unless—
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in accordance
with the provisions of this section.

39

See Polednak, supra note 31, at 346.
See id.; John C. Chobot, Enforcing the Cash Collateral Obligations of Debtors in Possession, 96 COM.
L.J. 136, 143 (1991) (“Once cash collateral has been dissipated and spent, court-fashioned sanctions such as
retroactive protection, appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee or prohibitions against the further use of cash
collateral can be hollow victories for a secured creditor and do not rise to the level of a ‘remedy’. This is
especially true where all remaining property of the estate is encumbered and the cash which has been spent
without permission cannot be replaced.”) (quoting Williams v. Am. Bank of the Mid-Cities, N.A. (In re
Williams), 61 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)).
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2); Polednak, supra note 31, at 346.
42 Polednak, supra note 31, at 347.
43 Chobot, supra note 40, at 137 (citing Mercantile Nat’l Bank at Dallas v. Aerosmith Denton Corp. (In
re Aerosmith Denton Corp.), 36 B.R. 116, 119 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)).
40
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II. ANALYSIS: IN RE DELCO OIL, INC. AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
In Delco, the Eleventh Circuit dealt with the issue of whether a chapter 7
trustee may avoid the postpetition transfer of cash collateral by a debtor in
possession under § 549(a) of the Code.44 This decision harms innocent vendors
because it prevents them from recovering the goods they exchanged and forces
them to forfeit the cash collateral that was paid to them.45 This Part walks
through the Delco opinion and then discusses its negative ramifications.
A. The Delco Opinion
1. Facts
Delco Oil, Inc. (Delco) was a distributor of motor fuel and associated
products.46 As part of its motor fuel business, Delco entered into a sales
agreement with Marathon Petroleum Co. (Marathon) in 2003 to purchase
petroleum products.47 In 2006, Delco entered into a financing agreement with
CapitalSource Finance (CapitalSource), in which Delco pledged as collateral
all rights to its personal property, including collections, cash payments, and
inventory, to CapitalSource.48
On October 17, 2006, Delco filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy and requested
authorization to use CapitalSource’s cash collateral to continue its operations.49
The next day, the bankruptcy court authorized Delco to continue its business as
a debtor in possession, but did not make a decision regarding Delco’s request
to use its cash collateral until November 6, when it denied Delco’s request.50
But between October 18 and November 6, Delco had made $1.9 million in
cash distributions to Marathon.51
Later that year, the case was converted to a chapter 7 case and a trustee was
appointed by the bankruptcy court.52 The trustee then filed an adversary
proceeding against Marathon to avoid the postpetition distributions made to
Marathon under § 549(a), on the basis that Delco did not have the
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010).
See id. at 1257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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authorization from the secured creditor or bankruptcy court as required by
§ 363(c)(2).53 The bankruptcy court ruled in the trustee’s favor, and the district
court affirmed.54
2. Marathon’s Arguments
On appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, Marathon made three arguments for why
the payments it received were not avoidable under § 549(a).55 First, Marathon
argued that the funds it received from Delco did not constitute CapitalSource’s
cash collateral under Florida’s version of § 9-332(b) of the U.C.C.56 The
statute provides that “[a] transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the
funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts
in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”57
Marathon relied on this statute to argue that once distributed, the cashcollateral it received from Delco became free of CapitalSource’s security
interest because Marathon did not act in collusion with Delco.58 The cash
transfer, Marathon argued, had lost its status as cash collateral.59
Second, Marathon argued that even if the funds constituted cash collateral,
the distribution received is not avoidable because any violation of § 363(c)(2)
did not harm CapitalSource or the estate.60 In other words, Marathon claimed
that because the funds it received from Delco were equivalent in value to the
inventory exchanged, CapitalSource’s interest was not diminished since it had
a perfected security interest in Delco’s personal property.61
Finally, Marathon argued that an “implicit” defense exists under § 549 for
ordinary course transfers and for innocent vendors who deal with a debtor in
possession.62 Marathon claimed that this implicit defense exists as a matter of

53

Id.
Id.
55 Id. at 1259–62.
56 Id. at 1259 (citing FLA. STAT. § 679.332(2) (2002)).
57 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 679.332(2) (2002)).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1262; Brief of Appellant at 39, Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599
F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-11759), 2009 WL 1512875 (“Accordingly, to recover under section 549(a)
the secured party must establish that its interest in the collateral has ‘declin[ed] in value.’”) (citing In re
Sterling Dev., Inc., No. 11-08-14208, 2009 WL 196250, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.M. Jan. 26, 2006)).
61 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1262.
62 Id. at 1262–63.
54
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policy.63 Marathon dealt in good faith and was not aware that Delco’s cash
payments were not authorized. Marathon stated that it was unreasonable to
require vendors to investigate whether their customers have permission to
utilize their cash collateral in postpetition payments.64
3. The Court’s Analysis and Decision
The Eleventh Circuit rejected all of Marathon’s arguments.65 With regard
to Marathon’s first argument, that the funds it received did not constitute cash
collateral, the court stated that U.C.C. § 9-332(b) had no bearing on the
following dispositive facts: “(1) The Bankruptcy Code prohibited the transfer
to Marathon altogether, because CapitalSource had a perfected security interest
in [Delco’s] cash proceeds while they were in [Delco’s] hands, and (2) the
Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to avoid and take back unauthorized
transfers.”66 The court stated that it is beside the point that CapitalSource did
not have a security interest in the funds after Delco transferred them to
Marathon.67 The court added that to “determine whether the funds constitute
cash collateral,” one must examine “the status of the funds while they were in
[the] [d]ebtor’s hands before the disputed transfer . . . not at the moment after
the funds left [the] [d]ebtor’s control.”68
As to Marathon’s second argument, that there was no harm to the estate or
to CapitalSource, the court focused on the plain meaning of § 549. The court
concluded that a “harmless exception to a trustee’s [§] 549(a) avoiding power
does not exist,” and that “all [a trustee] needs to demonstrate to avoid the
transfer under [§] 549(a) is: (1) an unauthorized transfer occurred; (2) the
property transferred was property of the estate; and (3) the transfer occurred
[postpetition].”69 The court added that § 549 “does not require any analysis of

63

Id. at 1262.
Shane G. Ramsey, Avoiding the Pitfalls of In re Delco Oil, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2011, at 62.
65 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257–63.
66 Id. at 1260 (stating that CapitalSource may recover the funds Delco transferred to Marathon not
because the creditor continued to have a security interest in those funds, but “because Debtor was not
authorized to transfer the funds to anyone postpetition without the permission of CapitalSource or the
bankruptcy court”).
67 Id.
68 Id. (citations omitted) (adding that if the status of the funds were to be examined after they left the
debtor’s control, it would allow a debtor to circumvent section 363(c)(2) of the Code, as in such case the
proceeds would not be defined as cash collateral).
69 Id. at 1262.
64
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the adequacy of the protection of secured creditors’ interests nor does it
provide a harmless error exception.”70
Finally, the court rejected Marathon’s third argument that an implicit
defense exists under § 549 for ordinary course of business transfers made by
innocent vendors dealing with a debtor in possession.71 The court sought
guidance in the language of subsections 363(c)(1) and (2). Noting that
subsection 363(c)(2) set a specific limitation on a debtor in possession’s
express ability to use cash collateral derived from § 363(c)(1), the court
concluded that Congress “did not intend to allow the use of cash collateral
without the permission of the interested secured creditor or the bankruptcy
court, even if used in the ordinary course of business.”72 Referring to the plain
meaning of §§ 549(a) and 550, the Eleventh Circuit stated, “Congress knew
how to create exceptions based on [the] transferee’s status and culpability,”
and added that “it chose not to do so when it came to initial transferees of
[postpetition] transfers of cash collateral.”73
B. Criticism of Delco
Delco has been heavily criticized.74 The most relevant point to this
discussion is the fact that an innocent vendor received a double penalty—
losing both the cash collateral and a claim to the transferred inventory—for
receiving cash collateral without knowledge that the chapter 11 debtor had no
authorization to do so.75 This result stems from the Eleventh Circuit’s plain
meaning interpretation of § 549.76 In addition, the court did not rule on whether
Delco could use the cash collateral it had at the time Delco transferred the
funds to Marathon.77 This Section will review the court’s analysis in allowing

70

Id.
Id. at 1262–63.
72 Id. at 1263.
73 Id.
74 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 225 (“Delco Oil creates terrible problems for the trial courts,
lawyers and vendors who must apply the Court’s ruling.”); Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1 (“Delco
seems to be a bad decision . . . . We get the need for a court to interpret the Bankruptcy Code as written, but
the bankruptcy court (and perhaps one of the two appellate courts) could have done that and still have ruled the
other way.”).
75 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263.
76 Id. (“To avoid a transfer under Section 549(a) a trustee need only demonstrate: (1) a postpetition
transfer . . . (3) which was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the court . . . Congress knew how to
create exceptions based on transferee’s status and culpability. But it chose not to do so when it came to initial
transferees of postpetition transfers of cash collateral.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2012)).
77 Id.
71
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the chapter 7 trustee to avoid Delco’s unauthorized transfer of cash collateral,
and delineate how the court, by strictly construing § 549(a), brought about an
absurd result.
1. The Court’s Plain Meaning Interpretation
The plain meaning approach is a default rule of statutory interpretation.78 In
fact, looking at the plain meaning of a statute is “the most obvious and perhaps
the most objective focal point to determine what the law requires.”79 This
reasoning comes from the idea that a statute, when read plainly, depicts “what
our elected representatives intended . . . the law to mean.”80
But many cases illustrate that the plain meaning interpretation of a statute is
not always the optimal approach, because its use may bring about an absurd
result.81 This is largely due to the fact that statutory interpretation is a “holistic
endeavor.”82 Although the “plain meaning of legislation should be
conclusive . . . [there are] ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
drafters.’”83 If this is the case and an absurd result occurs, “then the intention
of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls.”84 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has stated that “even when the plain meaning did not produce
absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the
policy of the legislation as a whole,’” the Court should follow that purpose,
“rather than the literal words.”85

78 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 223 (2000).
79 Id.; see also Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (“There is, of course, no more
persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the
legislation. In such cases we have followed their plain meaning.”) (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking
Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)).
80 ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETT, supra note 78.
81 Am. Trucking, 310 U.S. at 543 (stating that the plain meaning of a statute is followed when words are
sufficient to determine the purpose of the legislation, but when that meaning leads to absurd results, the court
has looked “beyond the purpose of the act”).
82 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
83 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
84 Id.
85 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting American Trucking, 310 U.S. at
543).
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2. The Absurd Results
In rejecting Marathon’s argument that the trustee could not avoid the
payments because Delco’s violation of § 363(c)(2) did not cause harm to the
estate, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “a ‘harmless’ exception to a trustee’s
§ 549(a) avoiding powers does not exist.”86 The court added that § 549 “does
not require an analysis of the adequacy of protection of secured creditors’
interests [or provide] a harmless error exception.”87 The court explained that
there were two exceptions within § 549, but neither of those exceptions applied
in this case and that if Congress wanted to add an exception for innocent
vendors, then they would have done so.88
The Eleventh Circuit’s plain meaning reading of § 549 in Delco brought
about two absurd results, which are discussed in detail below.89 First, it is not
clear whether the secured creditor or the estate is entitled to the avoided
funds.90 Second, the court failed to address whether an innocent vendor is
entitled to an administrative expense claim upon return of the avoided
payment.91 Due to the court’s failure to address these issues, the innocent
vendor has to return the cash it received from the debtor, and forfeit the goods
it transferred without compensation.
a. Where Do the Avoidable Funds Go?
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision failed to address whether the secured party
or the estate should receive the funds recovered from the avoidance.92 This is
important because if a court were to follow Delco, it would have to decide
whether the lender or the estate is entitled to the funds recovered from the
postpetition avoidance. But either result would be problematic.93

86 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1262 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Congress created two exceptions to a trustee’s Section 549 avoiding powers. First, subsection (b), which
involves only involuntary bankruptcy cases and, second, subsection (c), which protects good faith purchasers
of real property. As this is a voluntary bankruptcy involving the transfer of cash in exchange for personal
property, neither exception provided by Congress applies.”).
87 Id. at 1262.
88 Id. at 1262 n.3, 1263.
89 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 224–26; Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89.
90 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 226.
91 Id. at 227.
92 Id. at 226.
93 Id.
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If the estate is entitled to the recovered funds, then the estate would receive
a windfall.94 Given that the innocent vendor transferred equivalent value for
the cash collateral it received, the estate would be able to keep both the
recovered cash collateral and the goods it had transacted for.95 This is where
the inequity arises, because the estate arguably received the equivalent value
for the cash collateral transferred to the vendor and was not harmed in the first
place.96 This result therefore would allow the trustee to use an avoidance
provision meant to restore the estate to the condition it would have been in had
the transfer not occurred, when the estate did not actually suffer harm.97 Due to
this, chapter 7 trustees will have an incentive to avoid similar postpetition
transactions in an effort to increase the value of the estate.
If a court were to return the recovered funds from a § 549(a) avoidance to
the lender instead of the estate, other difficulties arise.98 Returning the
recovered funds to the lender would be contrary to the language of § 550,
which grants the trustee the power to recover property transferred from a § 549
avoidance as long as it is for the benefit of the estate, not for the benefit of the
secured creditor.99 This is also inconsistent with the goal of § 550, which is to
restore the estate to the financial condition it would have been in had the
transaction not occurred.100 The goal and language of § 550 suggest that a
secured creditor should not directly benefit from a chapter 7 trustee’s
avoidance motion. What makes this more problematic is that in a case like
Delco, the innocent vendor received the funds free from any liens that the cash
collateral would have had while in possession of the debtor.101 As a result, the
trustee’s recovery for the benefit of the lender would not only be inconsistent
with the Code, but would also be contrary to the priority rules established by
the U.C.C.—under which the innocent vendor, as a transferee, took possession
of the cash collateral free from a security interest.102

94 Id. (allowing for avoidance of a transfer under 549(a), to an innocent vendor prior to conversion to
chapter 7, results in the estate keeping both the cash collateral transferred and the funds).
95 See id. (stating that other creditors are the ones who receive the windfall, as they will receive money
from the estate).
96 See id.
97 See Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011),
aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).
98 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 226.
99 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012).
100 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
101 Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227 (citation omitted).
102 U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (2001) (“A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the
transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.”).
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Interpreting Delco plainly, it doesn’t matter whether the court orders the
recovered funds to be transferred to the estate or to the lender, because either
action would bring about an absurd result that is either contrary to the purpose
of the Code, or contrary to the rules of priority in the U.C.C.
b. The Right to an Administrative Expense Claim
The Eleventh Circuit also failed to address whether Marathon was entitled
to an administrative expense claim.103 This is important because even though
the vendor lost the cash collateral it received from the debtor in possession, the
vendor’s transfer of goods still benefitted the estate.104 Section 503 states that
allowed administrative expense claims shall include, “the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate.”105 Section 503 is interpreted as
requiring that the expense not only be “‘actual’ and ‘necessary’, but also that
there be a concrete benefit to the debtor’s estate.”106 Given that Delco received
petroleum products in exchange for the cash collateral it gave to Marathon,
there is no doubt that those goods benefitted the estate. Therefore, pursuant to
§ 503, the vendor should be entitled to an administrative expense claim by
conferring such benefit to the estate.107 By obtaining an administrative expense
claim, the vendor’s claim would have priority over prepetition unsecured
claims.108
Although the vendor should be entitled to an administrative expense claim,
the vendor’s ability to do so is jeopardized by the court’s strict interpretation of
§ 549(a).109 This is due to a conflict arising between §§ 502(h) and 503.110
After moving to avoid the postpetition transactions to Marathon under
§ 549(a), the trustee proceeded to recover the cash collateral from the innocent
vendor via § 550.111 Section 502(h) states that a “claim arising from the
recovery of property under” § 550 shall be treated the same as a prepetition
claim.112 Thus, § 502(h) has the effect of transforming what should be an

103

Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227.
See 11 U.S.C. § 503; infra text accompanying note 106.
105 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
106 In re Beverage Canners Int’l Corp., 255 B.R. 89, 92 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000) (citation omitted).
107 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(3); see Beverage Canners, 255 B.R. at 92.
108 See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
109 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 225, 227.
110 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 503.
111 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2010);
see 11 U.S.C. § 550.
112 11 U.S.C. § 502(h).
104
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administrative expense claim under § 503 for the innocent vendor, into an
unsecured prepetition claim.113 This absurd result further highlights the burden
that is imposed on innocent vendors and is yet another reason why the court
should have created an innocent vendor exception for Marathon in Delco.
c. Legislative History
The conflict between §§ 502(h) and 503 may have resulted from the way in
which §§ 549 and 550 were rewritten from the previous bankruptcy statute.
However, it seems unlikely that Congress intended to create a statute that
effectively penalizes innocent vendors for receiving cash collateral, by
preventing them from recovering the value of the goods transferred through an
administrative expense claim. Furthermore, the history of §§ 502(h) and 550
demonstrates that Congress may not have considered the consequences of
including postpetition transfers among the types of transfers that may be
recovered under § 550.114
The current version of § 550 combines “parallel sections under prior law
defining the rights and liabilities of transferees when the transfers under which
they acquired property of the debtor were avoided.”115 This change was meant
to separate “the concepts of avoidability of transfers and the liability of and
recovery from transferees and to consolidate the rules respecting liability and
recovery in § 550.”116 By consolidating the rules respecting liability and
recovery in § 550, it is unlikely that the drafters of the Code foresaw that in
certain circumstances, such as those demonstrated by Delco, that avoiding
postpetition transfers under § 550 may produce an absurd result.117
Accordingly, Congress may not have foreseen that the inclusion of § 549, as a
provision under which a trustee can recover property for the benefit of the
estate under § 550, would effectively give postpetition transfers the same
treatment as unsecured claims.118
The legislative history of § 502(h) also offers compelling support for the
theory that Congress did not foresee a conflict between § 502(h) and § 503.

113

Id.; Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227.
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 502.LH[10].
115 5 id. ¶ 550.LH.
116 Id.
117 With the exception of § 549, which avoids postpetition transfers, every transfer that is recoverable
under § 550 is a prepetition transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 549–550; see 5 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 550.LH.
118 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(h), 549(a), 550.
114
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The reach of § 502(h) was not always as broad as it is today.119 In fact, the
scope of § 502(h) was limited to § 547 in earlier versions of bankruptcy reform
legislation:
A claim arising from the recovery of property under § 550 of this title
as a result of the avoidance under § 547 of this title of a setoff shall
be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c)
of this section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this
section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date of the
120
filing of the petition.

The earlier version of § 502(h) gave prepetition status only to claims arising
from the recovery of property that results from an avoidance of a setoff under
§ 547.121 Accordingly, the corresponding § 547 granted the trustee the power
to avoid preferential transfers.122
Although expanding the reach of § 502(h) further clarified the statute,123 it
is unlikely that Congress predicted that, by expanding § 502(h) to include
claims arising from recovery of an avoided transfer under § 550, postpetition
transfers of cash collateral would be treated the same as prepetition claims.
This result precludes innocent vendors from obtaining even an administrative
expense claim.124 It is unlikely that Congress would intentionally penalize an
innocent vendor by preventing them from obtaining an administrative expense
claim even when it conferred a benefit on the estate.

119

4 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 502.LH[10].
Id. (quoting S. 2266, 95th Cong. § 502(h) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 1989); H.R.
8200, 95th Cong. § 502(h) (as passed by the House, February1978)).
121 4 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 502.LH[10].
122 Id.
123 See id.
120

In thus expanding [§] 502(h) in the enacted version of H.R. 8200, [§] 502(h) is closer to the third
proviso of [§] 57n of the 1898 Act. As [§] 502(h) is drawn . . . it is unnecessary to draw the
distinction drawn by [§] 57n of the 1898 Act between a claim arising by reason of the recovery
by the trustee of money or property or the avoidance by the trustee of a lien on property of the
estate held by such person.
Id.
124 Congress may not have foreseen that by including § 549 as one of the sections through which recovery
can be sought via § 550, a claim would later be treated as a prepetition unsecured claim by § 502(h) and thus
be in direct conflict with permitting the vendor from obtaining an administrative claim for benefits conferred
on the estate. See id. (stating that § 549 is the only section avoiding postpetition transactions through which
recovery can be obtained in § 550).
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III. BURDEN ON INNOCENT VENDORS
A direct result of Delco is that vendors, unaware that the company with
which they do business is in bankruptcy, may lose inventory by transacting
with the debtor who pays using cash collateral.125 Thus, Delco imposes upon
vendors a significant burden to investigate whether the companies they deal
with are in bankruptcy, and if so, to further inquire whether such companies
have authority to spend any cash collateral they might possess.126 This burden
discourages vendors from transacting with companies that are in chapter 11
because it imposes an economic cost for vendors to fulfill their due diligence,
and as a result may delay the speed in which transactions are made.127 This
Part of the Comment will examine how Delco increases the cost of making
transactions for vendors, thereby reducing a vendor’s incentive to engage in
business with companies in chapter 11.
A. Performing Due Diligence
There are certain steps a vendor must take to avoid suffering the same fate
as Marathon. The first step a vendor would take to protect itself from the
“inequitable results” arising from the Delco decision is to monitor the credit of
all the companies with which it is doing business to determine whether they
have filed a petition for bankruptcy protection.128
Second, and more importantly, the vendor would have to learn whether the
debtor has the authority to pay for the vendor’s goods.129 To do this a vendor
would need to check the docket for any bankruptcy proceeding that the debtor
may have filed, and if the debtor does file for bankruptcy, make sure there is an
appropriate order giving the debtor sufficient authority to pay for services.130
125

See generally Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.

2010).
126

Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227.
See Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89; Charles M. Oellermann, Caveat Vendor: Eleventh
Circuit Rules That Unauthorized Payments by DIP Using Cash Collateral Must Be Disgorged, JONES DAY
(Sept./Oct. 2010), http://www.jonesday.com/caveat-vendor-eleventh-circuit-rules-that-unauthorized-paymentsby-dip-using-cash-collateral-must-be-disgorged-09-30-2010/ (“Any vendor that receives postpetition payments
from [the debtor in possession] is well advised to ensure that the [debtor in possession] has the requisite
creditor consent or court authority to make the payments . . . Absent such an assurance, vendors may refuse to
deal with a [chapter 11 debtor] whose assets are substantially encumbered.”).
128 Ramsey, supra note 64, at 63.
129 Id.
130 Daniel F. Gosch, I Have to Give What Back? Are You Serious? How to Deal with the In re Delco Oil
Decision, DICKINSON WRIGHT (Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.dickinson-wright.com/I-Have-To-Give-WhatBack-Are-You-Serious-How-To-Deal-With-The-Delco-Oil-Decision-10-20-2010.
127
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But the mere existence of an order is not dispositive in determining whether
the debtor has the authority to pay a vendor.131 In fact, the vendor must spend
even more resources to ensure that it is adequately protected.132 This is because
a cash collateral order may have provisions limiting the use of the debtor’s
cash collateral in one way or another.133 The “budget” that is attached to an
order usually defines the categories for which the debtor may use cash
collateral.134 However, even if an order defines these categories, the definitions
can be too generic or too narrow, and the vendor may need a second opinion to
determine whether their order is covered.135
Furthermore, a vendor would need to monitor whether the cash collateral
order is terminated.136 Termination of a cash collateral order may occur when
the order reaches a termination date, when the debtor defaults on a chapter 11
payment, or when a creditor files a motion to terminate the debtor’s permission
to use cash collateral.137 Therefore, “[a]bsent finding some specific language in
a cash collateral order specifically addressing this termination issue when [the
vendor has] it reviewed, [the vendor] will need to monitor the case docket on
an ongoing basis.”138 This requires careful monitoring, which may
substantially reduce the risk of dealing with an unauthorized debtor. On the
other hand, such careful monitoring would increase the cost of dealing with
chapter 11 debtors.139 If a vendor finds through due diligence that a debtor did
not have authorization to use its cash collateral, then the vendor must try to
stop any shipment of goods to the debtor, which could be quite costly.140
B. Dealing with Executory Contracts
Although vendors can stop the shipment of goods to a company that they
know has no permission to use its cash collateral, this option may not always
be available.141 An example of this situation arises in executory or service

131

Id.
See id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. (“A more generic budget may be better for [the vendor] than a more specific one, since a budget
that has a line described as ‘suppliers’ arguably covers everyone supplying goods to the debtor.”).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 See Ramsey, supra note 64, at 63.
132
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contracts.142 In these types of contracts, the vendor would consider using state
law remedies mirrored from the U.C.C.143 For example, under § 2-609 of the
U.C.C., “if a vendor has reasonable grounds for insecurity about the debtor’s
ability to perform its obligations under a sales contract, the vendor may
demand that the debtor provide adequate assurance of its ability to perform
under the contract.”144 In service contracts, Article 2 of the U.C.C. is
inapplicable, but § 251 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has been
adopted in some jurisdictions and can be used to seek relief.145 Another option
for the vendor is to make a motion under § 365(d)(2) and try to compel the
debtor to assume or reject the executory contract.146
The constant monitoring of the bankruptcy proceedings by the vendor will
not only eat away at the vendor’s resources, but will also likely delay the speed
at which transactions occur between the vendor and the debtor in possession.147
This will discourage vendors from doing business with debtors that are in
chapter 11.148 Additionally, the delays in transactions are likely to hurt the
debtor’s ability to succeed in its attempt at reorganization. Transaction delays
will translate into long periods of time in which the debtor in possession will
not have the necessary materials to continue doing business when the debtor is
in a vulnerable state. Therefore, the burden placed on vendors as a result of
Delco is contrary to one of the main goals of chapter 11, which is to encourage
vendors to do business with debtor companies, and help enable their
reorganization.149
IV. OTHER WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE DEBTOR’S UNAUTHORIZED USE OF
CASH COLLATERAL
The Delco decision focused on the need to police debtors and keep them
from violating § 363(c)(2) by using cash collateral without permission from the

142

Id. at 63, 100.
Id. at 100.
144 Id. (citing U.C.C. § 2-609 (2004)).
145 Id. at 63, 100.
146 Id. at 100 (citation omitted) (“Although such a motion is unlikely to be granted at an early juncture in
the case, a vendor could use such a motion as an opportunity to obtain a court order approving the payments to
it pending the debtor’s decision to assume or reject the contract.”).
147 See Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227.
148 Id.
149 Id.; see Dill v. Hall & Assocs. (In re Indian Capitol Distrib., Inc.), No. 09-11558-s7, slip op. at 31
(Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 5, 2011).
143
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secured creditor or the bankruptcy court.150 The court suggested that if this
policing did not occur, then a debtor could distribute the cash collateral and
render the security interest “virtually meaningless.”151 But avoidance of the
debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral is not the only way of policing
§ 363(c)(2), as there are other tools that may be more effective in preventing
debtors from using cash collateral without authorization.152 More importantly,
these alternatives do not affect the commercial dynamic between vendors and
debtors.153 This Part will consider possible alternatives that may be used to
deter debtors from using cash collateral without proper authorization as
outlined in § 363(c)(2).
In Delco, the chapter 7 trustee brought an avoidance action to recover cash
collateral that a debtor in possession transferred without authorization while
the case was in chapter 11.154 This is worth noting because the trustee sought to
avoid Delco’s postpetition transfer of cash collateral while keeping the
inventory it had obtained from the transaction.155 As a result, the secured
creditor benefited when it recuperated the cash collateral spent by the
debtor.156 The court justified its decision by pointing out the need to police a
debtor in possession’s misuse of cash collateral.157 In circumstances similar to
those in Delco, there are other means for a court to remedy the debtor’s misuse
of cash collateral, such as granting a secured creditor a higher claim for the
value of the cash collateral lost, without sacrificing the payment made to the
vendor.158 The Code, however, is silent as to what specific penalty or sanction
should be imposed upon a debtor who misuses cash collateral.159 In the
absence of statutory guidance, bankruptcy courts have applied different
remedies and sanctions.160

150 Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2010);
Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88.
151 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1261.
152 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88.
153 Id.
154 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1257.
155 Id.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 1261.
158 See Polednak, supra note 31, at 360.
159 See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); Chobot, supra note 40, at 137; Polednak, supra note 31, at 344–45
(citation omitted) (“Despite the importance of cash collateral to both the debtor and secured creditor, the
[Code] appears indifferent as to the proper use of cash collateral. Furthermore, the [Code] fails to provide
secured creditors with clear protection against a debtor’s misuse of cash collateral.”).
160 Chobot, supra note 40, at 141.
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Giving the lender a replacement lien is one of the most common remedies
courts use when a debtor uses cash collateral without authorization.161 Granting
the secured creditor a replacement lien would remedy the secured creditor’s
position by granting the secured creditor a lien on any new unencumbered
property the debtor obtains, placing the secured creditor in the same position it
was in prior to the transaction.162 Replacement liens seem like an equitable
solution because it re-instates the lender’s secured status and allows the debtor
to continue to have the opportunity to reorganize. However, this remedy may
not always be available because the debtor may not have new unencumbered
property at that moment.163
An example of a granted replacement lien occurred in In re Aerosmith
Denton Corporation.164 In this case, the debtor in possession converted about
$13,000 of encumbered prepetition accounts into cash and commingled them
in bank accounts, effectively washing away the identity of the cash.165 The
bank sought a replacement lien on the debtor’s postpetition accounts and the
imposition of penalties.166 The court determined that the $13,000 constituted
cash collateral and that the debtor in possession misused the cash collateral,
thereby violating § 363(c)(2).167 The court granted the creditor a replacement
lien on the debtor’s postpetition accounts to secure the misused $13,000, and
supplemented it with an administrative expense claim.168 The court also noted
that the Code does not explicitly provide remedies or sanctions for a debtor’s
misuse of cash collateral.169 However, the court cited to § 105 as giving it
authority to grant the replacement lien, stating that the “[c]ourt does have an
obligation to carry out the intent of Congress in its enactment of the
[Code].”170
161

Polednak, supra note 31, at 360.
Id. (citation omitted).
163 Id.; Chobot, supra note 40, at 141, 143 (“Once cash collateral has been dissipated and spent, courtfashioned sanctions such as retroactive protection, appointment of a [c]hapter 11 trustee or prohibitions against
the further use of cash collateral can be hollow victories for a secured creditor and do not rise to the level of
‘remedy’. [sic] This is especially true where all remaining property of the estate is encumbered and the cash
which has been spent without permission cannot be replaced.”) (quoting Williams v. Am. Bank of the MidCities, N.A. (In re Williams), 61 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986)).
164 Chobot, supra note 40, at 142.
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Aerosmith Denton Corp. (In re Aerosmith Denton Corp.), 36 B.R.
116, 117 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)).
167 Id. (citing Aerosmith, 36 B.R. at 117).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. (citing Aerosmith, 36 B.R. at 119).
162
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Giving “super priority status” on the portion of the funds misused by the
debtor is another common remedy for secured creditors injured by the
unauthorized use of cash collateral.171 To grant the creditor this remedy, the
court derives authority from §§ 364(d) and 507(a).172 “By drawing an analogy
between the debtor’s receipt of new funds from a lender and the debtor’s
unauthorized use of cash collateral, the bankruptcy courts in effect treat the
injured secured creditor like a lender who has given a [postpetition] loan on
previously encumbered collateral.”173 Thus, the portion of collateral that was
misused is given “super priority status” by making that amount an
administrative expense claim pursuant to § 507(a).174 Hence, the payment for
the recovery of lost funds is virtually guaranteed.175
In addition to replacement liens and the grant of super priority status, there
are other ways to discourage debtors from violating § 363(c)(2). For example,
misuse by the debtor of cash collateral in violation of § 363(c)(2) may
constitute a bankruptcy crime under title 18.176 Additionally, compensatory
sanctions can be given to the officers and others who control a debtor that uses
cash collateral without proper authority.177 Officers of a debtor company that
uses cash collateral without authorization may face serious penalties, such as
personal liability for conversion.178 For this reason, any officer that participates
in the unauthorized use of cash collateral may be jointly and severally liable
for conversion, and a monetary judgment may be rendered against him.179
These tools are preferential to the method adopted in Delco because they create
a disincentive for debtors tempted to misuse cash collateral, and do not hurt
innocent vendors.180

171

Polednak, supra note 31, at 361 (citation omitted).
Id.
173 Id. at 362.
174 Id.
175 See id. (citation omitted).
176 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
177 Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 88.
178 Dean P. Wyman, Cash Collateral: The Risks of Non-consensual Use, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 1999,
at 12 (“Conversion is the ‘wrongful exercise of dominion and control over another’s property in denial of or
inconsistent with his rights.’”) (quoting Amarillo Nat’l Bank v. Komatsu Zenoah Am., Inc., 991 F.2d 273, 274
(5th Cir. 1993)).
179 Id.
180 See Friedland & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 89.
172
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V. HOW CAN COURTS AVOID THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DELCO?
This part addresses the authority courts have to create an exception for
innocent vendors. This authority derives from two concepts in the Code. First,
courts have avoided interpreting § 549 in a plain meaning manner. Second,
courts can draw authority from § 105 to exempt innocent vendors from the
inequities resulting from the avoidance of postpetition transfers like those in
Delco.
A. Different Treatment by Other Courts
In the wake of Delco, some courts have treated the avoidance of a debtor in
possession’s unauthorized postpetition transfers differently.181 Although these
cases had similar facts, the courts did not apply the same strict interpretation of
§ 549 as the Eleventh Circuit did in Delco. The alternative interpretations did
not bring about the absurd result of punishing the innocent vendor for the
debtor’s act of using cash collateral without permission.182
1. Wood Treaters
In Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), a district
court within the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Delco on comparable facts and
came to a different conclusion on the avoidance of postpetition transfers of
cash collateral.183 Instead of looking at the plain meaning of § 549(a), the
district court focused on the jurisdictional question of whether there was injury
to the estate.184
Wood Treaters, L.L.C. filed a chapter 11 petition on March 16, 2009.185 On
March 18, Wood Treaters obtained permission to operate its business as a
debtor in possession.186 The court entered orders for the debtor in possession to

181 See, e.g., Abbott v. Arch Wood Prot., Inc. (In re Wood Treaters, L.L.C.), 479 B.R. 122, 126 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 2012).
182 See, e.g., id. at 133.
183 See id. at 126.
184 Compare Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir.
2010) (“Section 549 does not require any analysis of the adequacy of protection of secured creditors’ interests
nor does it provide a harmless error exception.”), with Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 126 (“[T]he [c]ourt may
consider the issue of injury to the estate in determining whether a trustee may avoid a postpetition transfer
under § 549(a) . . . .”).
185 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 124.
186 Id.
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use the cash collateral of Regions Bank in three different instances.187 Regions
Bank assigned its claim to 2010 Angelina Capital Fund (Angelina) in April
2010.188 From May to July of 2010, Wood Treaters purchased products from
Arch Wood Protection, Inc. in five separate transactions.189 In July 2010,
Angelina filed a motion to terminate the use of cash collateral based on the
debtor’s violation of the cash collateral order.190 After the court terminated the
debtor’s permission to use cash collateral, the case was converted to chapter
7.191
The trustee relied on Delco to argue that she was only required to prove the
three elements of § 549(a): (1) a postpetition transfer was made, (2) of property
of the estate, (3) that was not authorized by the Code or the Court.192 The
trustee added that it is “irrelevant” that “the estate received value in exchange
for the transfer [of cash collateral]” because “injury to the estate is not an
element under § 549(a).”193 The vendor contended that the trustee lacked
standing to bring the action because the trustee had not shown that the transfers
of cash collateral caused injury to the estate.194 The vendor added that the
estate was not injured because “it received goods of equal value in exchange
for the transfers.”195
The district court disagreed with the trustee and stated that the facts from
Delco were “materially different” from this case and that “the issue of injury to
the estate was not evaluated by the Eleventh Circuit as a jurisdictional
question.”196 The court distinguished the case from Delco in two ways.197 First,
it stated that the debtor in Delco did not have authority from the bankruptcy
court, nor from the lender, to use its cash collateral and that the debtor spent
almost $2 million while its motion requesting permission to use cash collateral
was still pending.198 Second, the court stated that unlike the vendor in Wood
Treaters, the vendor’s defense in Delco “focused on whether the lender’s
interest had been adequately protected, and not on whether the estate had been
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198

Id.
Id.
Id. at 124–25.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 125 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
See id. at 127.
Id.
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injured.”199 Due to these differences, the district court said it was not precluded
by Delco from considering “the question of injury to the estate in determining
whether the [t]rustee established her avoidance claim under § 549(a).”200
In determining the question of injury to the estate, the district court noted
that the Eleventh Circuit did not view this as a jurisdictional question.201 The
court stated that “[a]ny party who invokes federal jurisdiction ‘bears the
burden of demonstrating his standing to sue;’” to satisfy the constitutional
standing requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that
there is an “injury in fact.”202 Thus, the court concluded that it may consider
the question of injury to the estate as a jurisdictional matter under Article III of
the Constitution because the vendor asserted that the debtor’s payments were
made in exchange for goods of equivalent value, and due to this, it did not have
standing to sue.203
The court also found that the determination of whether there is injury to the
estate is consistent with the purpose of § 549.204 The court agreed that the
purpose of § 549 is to “allow the trustee to avoid those postpetition transfers
which deplete the estate while providing limited protection to transferees who
deal with the debtor.”205 Additionally, the court held that the “focus of § 549
and § 550” is on “what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the transfer.”206
The court deemed the question of injury to the estate to be consistent with the
goals of § 549 because if there is injury to the estate, then the avoidance
powers of §§ 549 and 550 would be necessary to recover the loss that the estate
199 Id. The vendor argued that the cash collateral it received did not cause harm to the estate nor to the
lender because it gave equivalent value in inventory for the funds transferred to it by the debtor. Unlike Wood
Treaters, the debtor in Delco did not assert that the trustee lacked standing. Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen
(In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2010).
200 Wood Treaters, 479 B.R. at 127.
201 Id.
202 Id. (quoting White v. Whittle (In re Whittle), 449 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)).

Article III of the Constitution provides that federal courts may only hear cases or controversies.
Standing is an essential part of the case or controversy requirement. The constitutional minimum
requirements of standing require a plaintiff to demonstrate (1) an injury in fact; (2) that the injury
is fairly traceable to the alleged misconduct of the defendant; and (3) that a favorable decision is
likely to redress the injury.
Id. at 127–28 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
203 See id. at 128.
204 Id. at 129.
205 Id. at 128–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting ETS Payphones, Inc. v. AT&T Universal
Card (In re PSA, Inc.), 335 B.R. 580, 584 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005)).
206 Id. at 129 (quoting Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226, 233–34 (Bankr.
D. Utah 2011), aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suffered.207 Thus, the court denied the trustee’s motion for summary judgment
on the ground that the trustee must prove that the estate suffered an injury that
is redressable by a judgment in her favor.208
2. C.W. Mining
Another post-Delco case that addressed the avoidance of unauthorized
postpetition transfers is Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.).209
Here, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah looked to the question of
whether a postpetition transfer of cash to a secured creditor caused injury to the
estate to determine if the transfer was avoidable under § 549(a).210 The court
held that unauthorized postpetition transfers of property of the estate should
not be avoided when the avoidance of such transfers result in zero benefit to
the estate.211
C.W. Mining entered into three loan agreements with the Bank of Utah to
finance the acquisition of mining equipment.212 Each loan agreement was fully
secured by the equipment and included cross-collateralization provisions
covering all of the assets secured by any of the notes.213 In January 2008,
Mining’s creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding under chapter
11, which was granted on September 26, 2008.214 The chapter 11 proceeding
was later converted into a chapter 7 proceeding, and a trustee was appointed.215
After the case was converted to chapter 7, the bank liquidated a certificate of
deposit in favor of C.W. Mining and obtained $383,099.216 The bank used
those proceeds and applied them to the notes which the debtor owed.217 Once
the case was converted to chapter 7, the trustee sought to avoid $383,099 in
postpetition payments made by C.W. Mining to the Bank of Utah under
§ 549(a), and to recover that amount under § 550(a)(1) without cancelling the
satisfaction of the bank’s lien.218 Here, the chapter 7 trustee sought to recover
207

See id.
Id. at 130.
209 See generally Rushton v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 465 B.R. 226 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011).
210 Id. at 231.
211 See id. at 234.
212 Id. at 229.
213 Id. (describing how the provision meant that “all of the assets securing any one of the [n]otes secured
all of the [n]otes, and the Bank’s security interest was properly perfected”).
214 Id. at 229–30.
215 Id. at 230.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See id.
208
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the payment made by the debtor to the bank while keeping the reduction of the
lien that resulted from the bank applying the proceeds from the certificate of
deposit to the outstanding notes.219
In analyzing “the consequences of avoiding a transfer to a fully secured
creditor,” the court noted that it is “critical to recognize that the transfer that
the [t]rustee seeks to avoid was a payment to a fully secured creditor in
exchange for satisfaction of a portion of a lien.”220 In other words, the trustee
sought to keep the money and lift the secured creditor’s lien.221 The court
found that the result was inequitable and contrary to the purpose of the
Code.222 This double gain is similar to the windfall evidenced in Delco.223 The
court criticized such a result by stating that such actions do “not return the
parties to the status quo, is unrelated to any damages, is clearly punitive in
nature, and creates a windfall for the bankruptcy estate.”224
The court was guided in its analysis by the purpose of § 550.225 The court
acknowledged that § 550(a) is intended to “restore the estate to the financial
condition it would have enjoyed if the transfer had not occurred,” and that
focus should be placed on “what the bankruptcy estate lost as a result of the
transfer.”226 Looking at the consequences if the avoidance was to be awarded,
the court noted that the avoidance of the payment to the bank would bring the
same amount of money back into the estate as would be reduced in the bank’s
lien.227 The court categorized the chapter 7 trustee’s approach as a punitive
theory of the Code, “which must be rejected.”228 Therefore, by considering the
purpose of § 550 in light of the facts, the court concluded that it would be
meaningless to grant judgment to the trustee in the adversary proceeding.229

219

Id.
Id. at 231.
221 See id.
222 Id. at 233 (“The Trustee’s attempt to recover the $383,099 Transfer free and clear of the Bank’s lien is
clearly inconsistent with the intent of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
223 See Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010),
aff’d, 477 B.R. 176 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012).
224 C.W. Mining, 465 B.R. at 231.
225 See id. at 233–34.
226 Id. at 233 (quoting Rushton v. Drive Fin. Servs. (In re Gardner), No. 05-27551, 2007 WL 2915847, at
*3 (Bankr. D. Utah Feb. 23, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
227 Id. at 234.
228 Id.
229 Id.
220
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B. Authority the Court May Use to Create an Exception
Bankruptcy courts have traditionally been recognized as courts of equity.230
As such, bankruptcy courts should have judicial authority to prevent the absurd
result created by the plain meaning interpretation of §§ 549 and 550. In light of
this, this section explores the extent of the bankruptcy courts’ judicial authority
to grant an innocent vendor exception under § 549. First, it will examine the
purpose of § 105 and whether its use can be used to exempt innocent vendors.
Then, it will examine the way in which critical vendor exceptions were
created, and the legal support courts have used to issue critical vendor orders.
Section 105(a) is a general provision that allows for the broad exercise of
power in the administration of a bankruptcy case.231 It states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
232
process.

Section 105 is meant to give bankruptcy courts the necessary power to “take
whatever action is appropriate or necessary in aid of the exercise of their
jurisdiction.”233 The status of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity was
confirmed in United States v. Energy Resources Co., where the Supreme Court
stated that bankruptcy courts have “broad authority to modify creditor-debtor
relationships.”234 Nonetheless, the power given to bankruptcy courts under
§ 105 is limited, because it does not allow a bankruptcy court to ignore other
provisions of the Code, or the requirements of any other state or federal
statute.235

230

2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01[1] (citation omitted).
Id.
232 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
233 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01 (citations omitted).
234 United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (citations omitted).
235 2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01 (citations omitted); see In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th
Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)) (stating
that § 105(a) “does not create discretion to set aside the Code’s rules about priority and distribution; the power
conferred by § 105(a) is one to implement rather than override. . . . ‘The fact that a bankruptcy proceeding is
equitable does not give the judge a free-floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his
personal views of justice and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.’”).
231
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Although the boundaries of § 105 are not strictly delineated, an “expansive
construction [of § 105] is justified” given the broad power vested in
bankruptcy courts to “reorganize debtors, to afford a fresh start to debtors and
to distribute funds equitably to creditors.”236 This broad power has been
verified by the Supreme Court, which stated that “‘[t]he jurisdiction of
bankruptcy courts may extend more broadly’ in chapter 11 cases than in
chapter 7 cases.”237
An important example of how courts have relied on their equitable powers
to develop bankruptcy law is the critical vendor exception.238 Vendors are
labeled critical vendors “in the rare instances in which the payment of a
prepetition debt may be absolutely vital to the reorganization of a [c]hapter 11
debtor.”239 For example, payment of the prepetition debt may be vital because
the vendor may offer a good or service whose substitute cannot be located at
an acceptable price.240 This judicially created exception is one that is made to
further the goals of the Code and has found support in common law and
§ 105(a).241 Understanding the mechanism and theory used in granting the
critical vendor exception is important to demonstrate that bankruptcy courts
are equipped with the judicial authority to create an innocent vendor exception
under § 549(a).
Judicial authority to create a critical vendor exception began under the
common law doctrine of necessity.242 The “necessity of payment rule”
recognized the importance of allowing the trustee to pay prepetition debts of
suppliers who threatened to withhold essential goods or services.243 The
necessity of payment rule was applied mainly to allow for the survival of
railroad companies that could not survive without certain suppliers.244
Today, it seems unlikely that the doctrine of necessity will be used as
authority to provide critical vendor status.245For example, the Seventh Circuit
found in In re Kmart that the Bankruptcy Acts of 1898 and 1978 have
236

2 COLLIER, supra note 1, ¶ 105.01[2].
Id. ¶ 105.01 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 310 (1995)).
238 Travis N. Turner, Note, Kmart and Beyond: A “Critical” Look at Critical Vendor Orders and the
Doctrine of Necessity, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 431, 434 (2006).
239 See id. at 437 (quoting In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922, 932 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)).
240 Id. at 437–38.
241 Id. at 446–47.
242 See id. at 443–44.
243 See id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 445–46.
237
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displaced common law doctrines such as that of the doctrine of necessity.246
Moreover, the court added that “[o]lder doctrines may survive as glosses on
ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or later, but not as freestanding
entitlements to trump the text.”247
Although § 105(a) has been restricted in some circuits, such as the Seventh
Circuit, it has received a more liberal treatment in other circuits.248 A recent
example of a more liberal construction occurred in the Third Circuit.249 The
District Court of Delaware stated in In re Just for Feet, Inc. that the “Supreme
Court, the Third Circuit and the District of Delaware all recognize the court’s
power to authorize payment of prepetition claims when such payment is
necessary for the debtor’s survival during chapter 11.”250 Here, the court
referred to the necessity of payment doctrine, noting that although it is not
codified, the equitable power given to courts still exists under § 105(a).251 The
district court also referred to the origins of the necessity of payment doctrine
and how it aimed to “[recognize] that paying certain [prepetition] claims may
be necessary to realize the goal of chapter 11.”252
In re CoServ L.L.C. is another case in which a court construed § 105(a)
liberally.253 In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas
searched for a provision of the Code “that would make the issuance of a
critical vendor order necessary to carry out the purposes of the Code.”254
Another case in which a court considered the equitable nature of a bankruptcy
court is In re Chateaugay Corp.255 In this case, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York held:
A rigid application of the priorities of § 507 would be inconsistent
with the fundamental purpose of reorganization and of the Act’s grant
of equity powers to bankruptcy courts, which is to create a flexible

246

In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004).
Id. (citations omitted); see also Turner, supra note 238, at 446.
248 Turner, supra note 238, at 447–49.
249 See id. at 449.
250 In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 825 (D. Del. 1999).
251 See id. at 824.
252 Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
253 In re CoServ, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002).
254 Turner, supra note 238, at 449–50.
255 See generally Mich. Bureau of Workers’ Disability Comp. v. Chateaugay Corp. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
247
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mechanism that will permit the greatest likelihood of survival of the
256
debtor and payment of creditors in full or at least proportionately.

Further, with respect to the application of pre-plan proceedings required by
§ 1122,257 the court added, “[T]he fact that the bankruptcy courts are courts of
equity . . . allows exceptions to any strict rules of classification of claims.”258
Given that § 105 has been used to make “exceptions to any strict rules of
classification of claims” and to further the goals of the Code, it seems
reasonable that courts can use § 105 to create an exception for innocent
vendors in situations where they receive cash collateral in exchange for goods
of equivalent value.259
VI. PROPOSED INNOCENT VENDOR EXCEPTION
The proposed innocent vendor exception would have prevented the
inequity resulting from Delco.260 First, it prevents the problem of having the
innocent vendor lose the money received even though the estate and the
creditor were not harmed.261 By preventing the avoidance of the debtor’s
postpetition payment to the innocent vendor, the court would effectively avoid
this problem, because the chapter 7 trustee could not bring an avoidance action
under § 549(a) to repair harm made to a secured creditor.262 Second, it avoids
the absurd result that arises when an innocent vendor is prevented from
obtaining an administrative expense claim even though it conferred a benefit

256
257

Id. at 287.
11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a plan may place a claim or an interest in
a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or
interests of such class.
(b) A plan may designate a separate class of claims consisting only of every unsecured claim that
is less than or reduced to an amount that the court approves as reasonable and necessary for
administrative convenience.

258 Chateaugay, 80 B.R. at 288 (quoting Brinkley v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. & Realty Trust (In re
LeBlanc), 622 F.2d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1980)).
259 Id. (quoting LeBlanc, 622 F.2d at 879).
260 See generally Marathon Petroleum Co. v. Cohen (In re Delco Oil, Inc.), 599 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.
2010).
261 In a case like Delco, the estate would recoup the cash collateral paid to the vendor and the goods
received. See id. at 1262. By virtue of U.C.C. § 9-315, the creditor should have a security interest in the goods
for which the debtor exchanged the cash collateral. U.C.C. § 9-315 (2001).
262 But see Delco, 599 F.3d at 1260 (permitting the trustee to bring an avoidance action).
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on the estate.263 Third, it allows equitable remedies to come into play to help
police the debtor’s unauthorized use of cash collateral.264 The court may assign
sanctions or penalties against the debtor or its officers, and may assign
replacement liens or super priority status on newly unencumbered property in
order for the secured creditor to maintain an interest similar to that which it
had in the cash collateral.265 More importantly, these results are equitable
because they prevent the innocent vendor, as an innocent transferee, from
being punished for the debtor’s misconduct and allows the appropriate
sanctions to involve both the debtor and the corresponding creditor.
Through analysis of the critical vendor exemption, this Comment has
shown that courts do have the authority to create an innocent vendor judicial
exception to avoid the absurd results of decisions such as Delco. Also, courts
would not be stepping over the § 105 boundaries because previous courts have
created broader exceptions than the exception proposed in this Comment.
Alternatively, as illustrated by Wood Treaters and C.W. Mining Co., creating
an exception in this narrow instance may not even require the use of § 105.
CONCLUSION
To avoid the negative implications that resulted from Delco, courts should
create an exception for innocent vendors under § 549(a) who transact with
debtors that are using cash collateral without proper authorization. This
exception should apply when the vendor is innocent and when it exchanges
equivalent value for the received cash collateral. Delco showed that when
§ 549(a) is interpreted according to its plain meaning, certain absurd results
occur: (1) the innocent vendor loses the payment it received from the debtor
even though it transacted goods in return, and (2) the innocent vendor’s
opportunity to obtain an administrative expense claim pursuant to § 503 of the
Code is jeopardized by the mechanics of § 502(h).266 Additionally, this
Comment has demonstrated that the burden the decision places on vendors is
too high, as vendors have to spend resources and delay transactions in order to

263 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2012). By virtue of § 502(h), the vendor loses priority in its claim since the
transfer was recovered via § 550. Thus, what would have been an administrative expense claim becomes a
prepetition unsecured claim.
264 See Polednak, supra note 31, at 346–47.
265 See id. at 347 & nn.24–25 (citations omitted) (summarizing case law using remedies derived from the
Code and from other areas of law).
266 Delco, 599 F.3d at 1263.
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conduct due diligence and avoid the same fate that Marathon suffered in
Delco.267
Furthermore, the policies and legislative history behind §§ 549 and 550,
when combined with the goals of chapter 11, support the creation of an
innocent vendor exception.268 The purpose of sections §§ 549 and 550, to
repair any harm that was inflicted on the estate by a postpetition transfer, is
consistent with the creation of an innocent vendor exception, because the
exception will only apply in instances where the estate suffered no harm as a
result of the postpetition transfer of cash collateral.269 The legislative history of
§§ 502 and 550 have shown that the legislature,270 in drafting the current
sections of the Code, did not foresee that the avoidance of a postpetition
transfer under § 549(a) would create a conflict with an innocent vendor’s
priority under § 502(h) by turning a potential administrative expense claim into
a prepetition unsecured claim.271
This exception will prove useful in the near future for a few reasons. First,
it adheres to the interests that § 550 is meant to protect—unauthorized transfers
which result in loss to the estate. Second, it protects good faith vendors who
run the risk of losing not only their shipment of goods, but also the
corresponding payment that comes with it. More importantly, this exception is
consistent with the goals of chapter 11 because it increases the likelihood that a
debtor’s reorganization will be successful. Without the exception, vendors may
refuse to work with chapter 11 companies, as they could not be guaranteed
payments for their goods.
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Cf. Blossom & Henderson, supra note 13, at 227.
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